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Agricultural Land Use Choice:
A Discrete Choice Approach
Roger Claassen and Abebayehu Tegene
A discrete choice model and site-specific data are used to analyze land use choices between
crop production and pasture in the Corn Belt. Tbe results show that conversion probabilities
depend on relative returns, land quality, and government policy. In general it is found that
landowners are less inclined to remove land from crop production than to convert land to crop
production,
Agricultural land use decisions have a significant
effect on commodity supply and environmental out-
comes. Accordingly, land retirement has long been
used as both a short-term and long-tetm commod-
ity supply management tool and as a mechanism to
achieve conservation and environmental objec-
tives. As federal policy increasingly seeks to target
specific types of land for retirement, a more com-
plete understanding of the economic and land qual-
ity factors that shape land use decisions is needed
to provide policy makers with better information on
the consequences of altering land use policies or
programs (e.g., wetland delineation, CRP eligibil-
ity, etc.).
Most previous economic models of land use de-
cisions have used county- or state-level data, par-
tially obscuring the effect of site-specific land
quality characteristics (e.g., productivity) in land
conversions. Further, these models explain only
net changes in land use within the area of obser-
vation rather than actual land use conversions (e.g.,
Hardie and Parks 1997; Plantinga 1996). This
study uses a discrete choice model and fully dis-
aggregate or site-specific data on land use and
land quality to explain the choice of crop produc-
tion, pasture or CRP land use in the Corn Belt
region for the period 1980–87. Use of site-specific
data allows extension of previous land use research
in two ways: (1) spatial variation in land quality is
represented to the fullest extent possible; and (2)
the model focuses on the land use conversion de-
cision and associated adjustment costs or rigidities
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since it is possible to observe the characteristics of
land that actually changes use.
Given that land use policy now seeks to affect
the use of land with specific attributes and that land
quality varies widely, even within very small geo-
graphic areas, the use of site-specific data may be
a particularly important empirical refinement. Site-
specific data eliminate the need for acreage allo-
cation equations which assume that land quality
follows a definable parametric distribution. For ex-
ample, Lichtenberg (1989) assumes that intra-
county variation in land quality is logistically dis-
tributed around the county average for the land
quality indicator used. Stavins and Jaffe (1990)
assume that land quality follows a log-normal dis-
tribution but use no actual data on land quality.
Adjustment issues are also of critical importance
in understanding the consequences of land use
policy. It has been theorized that agricultural as-
sets, such as land, become “fixed” to a specific
sector (Johnson and Quance 1972; Edwards
1959), resulting in chronic overproduction. In
other words, crop production may be slow to adjust
to changing economic conditions because land
does not shift out of (into) crop production rapidly
enough when crop prices fall (rise). Hsu and Chang
(1990) note that adjustment costs can be used to
rationalize the theory of asset fixity. When adjust-
ment costs are linear, the dynamic adjustment cost
model is reduced to a static model and the size of
the “asset fixity trap” is defined by the marginal
cost of adjustment. Casual observation indicates
that land uses changes only slowly, suggesting that
there may be significant adjustment costs or rigidi-
ties associated with the process of land use change.
With data on specific land use conversions (e.g.,
crops to pasture, pasture to crops), parameters
which represent average adjustment costs and/orClaassen and Tegene Agricultural Land Use Choice 27
other sources of adjustment rigidity for each spe-
cific type of land use conversion can be estimated
and the potential for asymmetry in adjustment
costs can be explicitly recognized.
The purpose of the paper is twofold. The first is
to estimate conversion probabilities within agricul-
tural land uses for the Corn Belt using actual land
use conversions and disaggregated data. The sec-
ond purpose is to assess how conversion probabili-
ties are impacted by such factors as conversion
costs, land quality, and government policies. The
paper is organized as follows: the next section pre-
sents a discrete choice land allocation model; and
the section following that presents the data and
empirical analysis; the final section presents the
conclusions.
A Discrete Choice Model of Land Allocation
Assume that land is allocated to the use with the
largest discounted present value of expected future
net returns. Land can be allocated to either of two
uses, i and j. Land at sitel k in use i (e.g., a non-
cropland use such as pasture) is converted to the
alternative use, j (e.g., crop production), when the
present value of expected returns to the land in use
j is greater than the expected value in use i:
where VkJ~ is the present value of expected returns
for land at site k in use j at time t, including con-





Vkjt= ~ Et ~ - ckfij(l - Ykj,t-1)
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where His the farmer’s planning horizon; q is land
quality; Rj, t+h(~k) is the net annual return for land
at site k in use j at time t + h; r,+~ is the interest rate
at time t + m; ck~ij is the adjustment cost involved
in converting land from use i to use j, at site k and
time t; y/+,t_lis equal to one if land at site k is in use
j at time t – 1, zero otherwise; and Et denotes
expectation held at time t. With constant expected
returns and constant interest rates (see, for ex-
ample, Burt (1986); Tegene and Kuchler (1991),
among others), equation (1) reduces to
(la) Vkjt= ~E[Rjt(qk)] – Ckfij ( 1 – Ykj,t-1 )
where a = (1 – (1/(1 + r))~)r-]. When the farm-
er’s planning horizon is infinite (i.e., when H ap-
proaches infinity), a = l/r. Similarly,
(lb) Vkit= ~E[Rir(9k)] – Cktjiykj,f-1
While standard expectation formation models
measure farmers’ collective central tendency re-
garding expected returns, v’kj~ and Vkil may Vary
widely from site to site. Differences in unobserved
factors such as management skills, future price ex-
pectations, expectations about technology, local
market conditions, location relative to the farmer’s
farmstead, etc., may lead the owners of land with
similar productive potential to choose different
land uses while each maximizes the present value
of expected returns. Assuming that these differ-
ences create random and additive differences in
farmer expectations regarding the present value of
expected future returns, an individual farmer’s sub-
jective assessment can be written as:
where u is an unobserved random variable with
mean zero and finite variance. Given the random
term, the probability of use j at site k and time t,
conditional on prior land use is:
(2) pr(Ykjt = 1‘Ykj,f-l )= ‘r(vkjt + ‘kjt > ‘kit + ‘kit)
= %(t+it – Ukj, ~ vkj~ - Vkit).
Using equations (la) and (lb), the difference in the
present values of the two uses of land can be writ-
ten as:
(3) (Vkjt – ‘kit ) = a(qRjt(qk) - ‘it(qk)])
)
– Ckrv + (Ckfij + Cktj, .ykJ,t-l
or
(3’) (Vjjt –V;it )=~ (Vkjt - ‘kit) = (E[Rjt(9k)
1
– ‘ir(qk)]) – ~ Ckfij
1
+ ~ (Ckrij + Cktji)ykj,t–l.
Note that the second and third terms on the RHS
of equation (3’) represent annualized costs of ad-
justment incurred for the conversion of land from
use i to use j or vice versa. The entire RHS of
equation (3’) represents the difference in expected
annual returns between uses i and j, adjusted for
annualized adjustment costs. We thus have:
where F is a cumulative distribution function (calf).
The exact distribution of F depends on the distri-
bution of the random term (1/~)Ek, = (1/cx)28 April 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
(u~i,- u~i,). If the u’s are normally distributed, their
linear combination is also normally distributed; F
is the normal calf, and a binomial probit model is
implied.
Consider how changes in the independent vari-
ables affect the probability that land will continue
in, or be converted to land use j. Clearly, the prob-
ability of use j is increased by an increase in ex-
pected returns to use j and decreased by an increase
in expected returns to use i. For example, an in-
crease in crop prices which increases cropland re-
turns would unambiguously increase the probabil-
ity of continued crop production or conversion to
crop production, ceteris paribus. A change in the
interest rate or site-to-site variation in land quality
will affect the value of land in both uses, req-uiring
assessment of the relative impact of these changes
on use values. For example, the marginal effect of
the interest rate (r = I/a) isz:
(5) f(vijt – ‘Lif)(–cktij + (Ckrij + Cktji)Ykj,t-l)
where f is the probability density function for (1/
a)~~t. The sign of (5) depends on the previous land
use, y~j,l-~.When Ykj,t-1 = 1 (i.e., land at time t–
1 was in use j), equation (5) reduces to
f(vijt - ‘ijt)(ckfji) >0
(assuming positive conversion cost) implying that
higher interest rates increase the probability that
land will continue in use j. When ykj,t_l = O,equa-
tion (5) becomes
f(vrljt - ‘,il)(-ckfij) <0
implying that an increase in the interest rate will
reduce the probability of conversion from use i to
use j (increase the probability that land will con-
tinue in use i). That is, an increase in interest rate
unambiguously decreases the probability of land
conversion.
Similarly, consider the effect of site-to-site
variation in land quality. The marginal effect of




) fwj- u) ~-~ .
Assuming that returns to both land uses are in-
creasing in land quality, equation (6) is positive
when returns to land use j increase more rapidly
than returns to land use i in response to increasing
land quality3:
(7)
Data and Empirical Model
Empirical Model
Development of the empirical model begins by
specifying cropland as use j and non-crop use as
use i (details below). Non-cropland use is either
pasture (i.e., livestock grazing) or, when land is
eligible, enrollment in the Conservation Reserve
Program (CRP). In this section, we define mea-
sures of return for all three of these land uses and
describe how they can be incorporated into a
model of land use choice. From equation (3’) and
(4):
(8) ‘r(ykjt = 1 IYkj,f-1 ) = F (V~jl- V;,,)=
(
1
F E[RJt(9k)– ‘it(qk)] – ~ ckt~ +
)
~ (Cktij + Cktji)ykj,t-l .
The probability of cropland in year t, conditional
on land use in year t– 1, is specified as a function
of differences in expected returns from cropland
and non-crop uses and conversion cost.
One common measure of return from land own-
ership is the rent a tenant is willing to pay to use
the land (Tegene and Kuchler 1991; Burt 1986;
among others.). We measure returns to cropland
and noncropland uses by their respective rental
rates, which is a function of the quality of land. For
agricultural production, land quality can be defined
by the extent to which soil chemical, physical, and
topographic characteristics are conducive to crop
or to noncrop production. However, site-specific
measures of land rent, which capture variation in
soil properties conducive to crop or other enter-
prises, are not generally available, Annual state-
wide average rents paid for cropland and pasture
are available (Hexem and Jones), as are data on
cross-sectional differences in the quality of land
for agricultural production, A number of land qual-
ity indicators have been used in the agricultural
economics literature, including expected yield and
expected revenue (Heimlich 1989), land capability
class (Plantinga 1996; Hardie and Parks 1997;
Vesterby et al. 1997), and water holding capacity
(Lichtenberg 1989). Here, as discussed in the sec-
tion below, we use expected yield information
from the SOILS-5 database to construct a land
quality index.
We combine state-wide average rental rates with
cross-sectional data on land quality to specify site-
specific expected rental returns to cropland and
pasture as:
(9a) E[~jt(9k)] = E[~.jt] +‘)’j(qk –q.)
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(9b) E[RP,(%)] =EIR,P,I +7P(% – 9s)
where E[f?,jt] and .E[R,,PJ are expected state-wide
average cropland and pasture rental rates, respec-
tively, in states at time t, q,, is the average quality
of land in states, qk is the site-specific land quality,
and yj >0 and yP >0 are parameters which trans-
late the land quality differential of a given site
from the state-wide average into variations in site-
specific cropland and pasture rental returns, re-
spectively. That is, the state-wide average rental
rates form the time series component of land rents
while the land quality component captures cross-
sectional variation in returns to land. Above aver-
age quality lands (qk > q,) command higher (than
state average) rental rates,
A consideration in agricultural land use deci-
sions between cropland and noncrop land use is the
Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) which was
established by the 1985 farm bill. The CRP sig-
nificantly affected the value and use of eligible
land. Cropland which met erodibility and other cri-
teria was eligible for CRP enrollment beginning in
1986. In exchange for an annual payment, eligible
cropland enrolled in CRP was converted to grass
cover for a period of 10 years during which pro-
ducers where generally prohibited from making
other economic use of the land (e.g., haying or
grazing). As such, CRP could be considered a third
land use option. Unfortunately, the land use data
available for this study do not indicate whether
land converted to grass cover is actually enrolled in
the CRP. Thus, it is empirically impossible to con-
sider CRP as a third land use category.
Despite this limitation, a useful model can be
developed. First, we assume that on CRP-eligible
land, CRP enrollment—not pasture—is the alter-
native to continued crop production. CRP rental
rates have historically been much higher than typi-
cal pasture rental rates so that CRP tended to sup-
plant pasture (grazing) land use as an alternative to
crop production on eligible land, Producers who
were considering conversion of CRP-eligible crop-
land to pasture could invariably receive larger re-
turns through CRP enrollment. Second, we assume
most producers viewed CRP as a temporary diver-
sion from crop production. For pIanning horizons
longer than 10 years, landowners would return land
to crop production in year eleven. Many producers
who would not otherwise consider converting
cropland to pasture also opted for CRP enrollment,
because of lucrative terms. Moreover, the CRP
preserved producers’ farm program eligibility
(base acreage) so that land returned to crop pro-
duction after CRP would be eligible for program
benefits. In many or even most cases, crop produc-
tion will continue to be more profitable than pas-
ture land use when CRP contracts expire.








r(l + r) ’”’
R.,P,f is the state-wide avera e CRP contract rental
Fo rate in year t, O = (1 + r)- , and other terms are
as defined above (e.g., cx = l/r). The term in
brackets on the RHS of equation (10) indicates
that, for CRP-eligible land, return to non-crop use
of land is the annualized value of the flow of re-
turns from 10 years of CRP rental payments and
from crop production beginning in the eleventh
year, When land is CRP-eligible, the first term on
the RHS of equation (10) and the last term in the
brackets cancel, indicating that pasture land use is
not a viable option with the existence of CRP.
Substituting equation (9b) into equation (10) and
subtracting the result (expected non-crop return)
from expected crop return (equation 9a) yields:
+ + ~ Rci-p,t + (~j – I’p)
(~k- 9s)+ (Vp- ‘Yjkb
(qk -d
The first two terms on the RHS of equation (11)
model the expected difference between statewide
average cropland and non-cropland returns. For
land which is not CRP-eligible ($ = O), the ex-
pected difference is between cropland and pasture
rental rates. For CRP-eligible land ($ = 1), the
pasture rental rate drops out of the equation and is
replaced by the CRP rental rate (the second term in
equation 11), because we assume that CRP is the
relevant land use alternative for CRP-eligible crop-
land. The third and fourth terms on the RHS of
equation (11) describe how cross-sectional varia-
tion in land quality affects relative returns. The
fourth term allows the coefficient of the land qual-
ity variable to vary for CRP-eligible land,4 Be-
cause O<0<1, the overall marginal effect of land
quality variation can be smaller or larger for the
cropland/CRP land use decision than for the crop-30 April 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
land/pasture land use decision. To see this, note
that the third and fourth terms can be rewritten as:
(12) (?’j- l’p+ 41’p- @’Yj)(9k- ~.~)
When 4 = 1, the VP’S cancel and the marginal
effect of land quality variation in the cropland/CRP
decision is yj – (3yj.Only in the unlikely event that
Et= 1 (r = O)is the marginal effect of land quality
variation on the cropland/CRP decision equal to
zero. When Oyj = VP, marginal effects are the
same for both the cropland/pasture and cropland/
CRP land use decision. To select a model specifi-
cation, we estimated a model (equation 16 below)
using three land quality terms:
(13)
(’Yj ‘1’p)(9k - 9,s) + &Yp(~k - ~s) - @e3’j(9k - 9s).
However, the second and third terms provided no
additional insight into the role of land quality in the
cropland/CRP land use decision. Estimated coeffi-
cients were not individually or jointly significantly
different from zero at even the ten percent level.
Thus, we could not reject the hypothesis that mar-
ginal effects were the same for the cropland/
pasture and cropland/CRP land use decisions.
Moreover, dropping the second and third terms of
(13) entirely from the estimation had virtually no
effect on the value of other estimated coefficients
of the model. Given this evidence, we chose a
model incorporating only a single land quality
term: (Yj – vP)(q~ – q,:). Finally, because we have
only a single general indicator of land quality, yj
and VP cannot be estimated separately. However,
when yj > 7P, return to crop production rises more
rapidly with land quality than does return to pas-
ture (note that equation (6) can be written as f(V~jt
– Vji,)(yj – yP), which is positive when ~j > ‘YP).
Turning now to how expectations are formed, a
number of alternative approaches are used in the
literature (see, for example, Burt 1986; Eales et al.
1990; Tegene and Kuchler 1991; Just and Mira-
nowski 1993; among others). While there is no
consensus on a best model of expectation forma-
tion, we opt for a model which incorporates dis-
tributed lags.5 This approach is similar to that of
Burt in that no specific expectation mechanism is
imposed, u priori, but results can be consistent
with a variety of formal expectation formation
mechanisms. We have
As suggested by Judge et al., (1988, p. 723) the
length of the lag was determined empirically by
starting with a model which included a large num-
ber of lags (large M) on the rental rate difference
variable and reducing the lag length based on like-
lihood ratio tests. We estimated the model (equa-
tion 16) starting with five lags, and continued to
trim the lag length so long as t-tests showed that
the exclusion restrictions could not be rejected and
other estimated coefficients remained stable.6 The
resulting specification contains current and two
lagged values of the rental rate differences:
rn=o
- (1 - +M,p,,-m] + : @Lp,I
+ I’(W 9,,)?
where -y = -yj– yP.
Finally, although no adjustment cost data are
available, average relative adjustment costs can be
estimated.7 In our model, adjustment costs are es-
timated by three parameters: the parameters of the
lagged dependent variable, the interest rate, and the
interaction between the lagged dependent variable
and the interest rate (see equations 8 and 16). The
specification allows the model to capture those ad-
justment costs which vary with the interest rate and
those which do not. As noted by Palmquist (1989),
soil characteristics which can be changed by the
landowner will be changed when the potential for
increased return exceeds the cost of making the
change. When such changes occur in the context of
land use conversion, the costs (benefits) of such
changes will be reflected in the adjustment cost
parameters.
Specified as outlined above, the empirical model
can be written as:
(16)
‘r(ykjt = lhkj,t-l) = ‘(v;jt - ‘Lit)
= ‘(BO + B Iykj,f-1 + P2r + ~3rykj,t-1
+ ~~((1 – @(3)R,,i, – (1 – @)R,D,)
where ~ is a vector of unknown parameters, ~1 =
LO) 135 = Llt ~6 = 42, p8 = 7, and other param-
eters and variables are as defined above. The pa-
rameters are estimated by maximizing the likeli-
hood function:Claassen and Tegene Agricultural Land Use Choice 31
(17)
L = ~ ~ ‘(v~jf – v~~t)ykj’( 1 – F(V~j, – Vji,)) l-y~~’,
kt
Data
The model is fitted to data from the Corn Belt. The
Corn Belt region is of particular interest because it
is one of the most productive agricultural regions
in the world. The actions of Corn Belt farmers can
have a significant impact on world-wide supply of
commodities like corn and soybeans. Because a
significant portion of Corn Belt acreage has a high
erodibility index (Vesterby et al., 1997), soil deple-
tion and off-site damage issues are also of particu-
lar concern.
Cropland and pasture are the principle land uses
in the Corn Belt. Although the Corn Belt does
contain significant acreages of wooded land and
extensive development exists around larger cities,
the movement of land between agriculture and for-
estry and from agriculture to development was
very small during the study period. Because the
land use margins between agriculture and forestry
and between agriculture and urban land use are
relatively inactive, the key decision for the purpose
of this study is cropland versus pasture and crop-
land versus CRP land uses.8
Data on land use and land quality are obtained
from the 1987 National Resources Inventory
(NRI). For the Corn Belt (land resource region
(LRR) M) the NRI data file contains observations
on land use and land quality for over 48,000 sites.
Land resource region M contains all of Iowa, major
portions of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Minnesota, and
Missouri, and smaller parts of South Dakota, Ne-
braska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Michigan.
Only those sites which remain in crop produc-
tion or pasture use (or convert from one to the
other) throughout the study period (1980–87) are
used.9 A sample of 993 sites, roughly 4’%0 of the
qualifying sites, were selected at random. Using
cropping history data for 1979–1 981 and 1984–86,
a data set including six observations at each site
(1980-82 and 1985-87) was constructed; a total of
5943 observations. 10
As noted above, land quality is represented by
expected crop yields. The best available source of
consistent, nation-wide information on expected
crop yields is the SOILS-5 interpretative database,
collected and maintained by the Natural Resources
Conservation Service (NRCS) of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture. SOILS-5 crop yields approxi-
mate those of leading commercial farmers at the
management level that tends to produce the highest
net economic return per acre (Heimlich, 1989).
However, the SOILS-5 data base provides only a
limited number of alternative crop yields for each
soil. Although yields for a number of crops were
available for each soil, no single crop yield was
available for every soil represented in the sample.
Thus, an index of several yields was devised. The
index reflects the maximum expected gross rev-
enue obtainable from the production of one of four
crops: corn, soybeans, wheat, or bromegrass-
alfalfa hay. Expected revenue is calculated using
long term average commodity prices normalized
by the corn price. That is, corn revenue always
equals the corn yield, while revenue for other crops
are calculated by multiplying the crop yield by the
ratio of the commodity price to the corn price av-
eraged over the season-average price for all states
included in LRR M and over the years 1975
through 1992. 11For example, the revenue for soy-
beans was calculated as:
(18)
where Y~bis the expected soybean yield for site k




wheres indexes the state, S is the number of states
represented in the study, SBP is the price of soy-
beans and CNP is the price of corn. Then the over-
all land quality index is defined as:
(20)
qk = ‘ax(qfl$ db! d“, d?)
where cn = corn and wt = wheat. This procedure
is designed to provide appropriate weights for vari-
ous crop yields while avoiding the introduction of
year-to-year price variation which could cause col-
linearity between rental rate and land quality vari-
ables,
State-wide average cropland and pasture rental
rates are obtained from Jones and Hexem (1990).
State-wide average Conservation Reserve Program
rental rates are obtained from Osborn et al. (1989).
Nominal rental rates were converted to real rental
rates using the gross domestic product implicit
price deflator. The interest rate is the real rate of
return on ten year treasury bonds.
Finally, CRP eligibility was determined using
criteria as detailed by Osbom et al. (1989) and NRI
data on land capability classification, 1982 erosion
rates (as estimated by Universal Soil Loss Equa-
tion), and the soil’s T-level.32 April 1999
Results
Table 1 presents the results from estimating the
model. The joint explanatory power of the overall
model is measured using likelihood ratio tests in
which: (1) all parameters other than the constant
term are restricted to zero, where the correspond-
ing log-likelihood function is denoted by L(C); and
(2) all parameters other than the constant term and
the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable are
restricted to zero, with log-likelihood function
L(LD). L(p) is the value of the log-likelihood func-
tion evaluated at the estimated parameters. The
second test is particularly important in this case.
Because land use changes are very gradual (land
use changes on only 92 of 5943 observations of the
study period) a great deal can be explained by the
lagged dependent variable alone. The likelihood
ratio statistics for each test are shown below table
2. Both tests show that the relevant set of explana-
tory variables are jointly significant at the 1Yo
level.
The signs of the estimated coefficients are con-
sistent with expectations. The distributed lag coef-
ficients of the rental rate differences show the time
profile of the effects of this variable. Coefficients
of the rental rate difference are positive for the
current year and the first lag and is negative for the
second lag. This profile suggests that farmers ex-
pectations regarding future rental rates differences
are based on an extrapolation of recent trends in
Table 1. Parameter Estimates
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rental rate differences: when cropland rental rates
are large relative to pasture rental rates in the cur-
rent year compared to previous years, the probabil-
ity of conversion to cropland or continued cropland
use rises. The sum of the current and lag coeffi-
cients of the rental rate difference is positive, im-
plying that the total effect or long-run effect of this
variable is to increase the probability of conversion
to cropland or continued cropland use. Both in the
short- and long-run as cropland rental rates in-
crease relative to pasture rental rates, the probabil-
ity of conversion to cropland increases.
The estimated coefficient of the CRP variable is
negative and significant at the 190 level. As ex-
pected, the results indicate that as CRP rental rates
increase, the probability that CRP eligible land will
be retained in crop production declines. The posi-
tive and significant coefficient of the land quality
variable indicates that crop profits are more sensi-
tive to the land quality changes that underlie the
variation in crop yields than are pasture profits.
Note that the crop yield parameter reflects the
change in cropland rental rates relative to pasture-
land rental rates as land quality changes (equations
6 and 7). The absolute effect of land quality on
rental returns in either use cannot be obtained from
the estimation.
Regarding interest rates, the theoretical model
predicts that an increase in the interest rate de-
creases the probability of land conversion. The re-
sults show that the probability of pasture to crop-
Parameter Estimate
Variable Notation Parameter (t-ratio)
Constant P. -0.807
(-1.520)
Lagged dependent variable yk~,t-1 P, 3.27*;
(5.547)
Interest rate r D, -.121*
(-2.343)
Interest rate x lagged ?k~,t-1 (% 0.903
dependent variable (1.631)
Rental rate difference (c) (1 - 40?,,, - (1 - +)%[ P. .0223*
(2.053)
Rental rate difference (t - 1) (1 - @3)R,,y,,_,- (1 - +)R.i,,_, P5 .0039
(.829)
Rental rate difference (t - 2) (1 - l$6))R,j,,_2- (1 - d?)R.i,r_2 (% -.0184
(-1.632)
CRP rental rate WWRc,P., P, –.0121**
(-3.120)
Land quality index qk – q., Ps .00244*
(2.069)
L(C) = -3 133.36; L(LD) = -460.69; L(p) = -440,05.
2[L((3) - L(C)] = 5,386,62.
2[L(~) - L(LD)] = 41.82,
**Significance at 1% level, *5% level.Claassen and Tegene Agricultural Land Use Choice 33
Table 2. Comparison of Relative Return and Adjustment Costs for Average Quality Land
in Iowa
2 3 4 5 6 7
1
CRP Relative Adj. Cost, Adj. Cost, Pr Convert Pasture Pr Convert Cropland to
Year Eligible? Return cij(r) cji(r) to Cropland Grass Pasture (or CRP)
1980 — .651 1.306 2.936 .072 ,0027
1981 .654 1.555 2.873 .044 .0033
1982 — .493 1.477 2.892 .037 .0050
1985 — .282 1.299 2.938 .034 ,0079
1986 no .011 .983 3.017 .038 ,0132
1986 yes -.435 .983 3.017 — ,0379
1987 no .058 1.044 3.002 .037 .0121
1987 yes -.469 1.044 3.002 .0421
land conversion is in fact reduced with an increase
in the interest rate. However, for land which is
already in crop production, the effect of the interest
rate is not significantly different from zero. When
Ykj,f-1 = 1 (land is cropped the previous year), the
derivative of equation (16) with respect to the in-
terest rate, r, is
(21) f(v~jt - ‘L)(P2 + P3).
Using a Wald test (X2(1 ~ = .42), the hypothesis:
(32+ & = Ocould not be rejected, indicating that
the interest rate has no significant effect on the
land use decision when land was cropped the pre-
vious year.
Adjustment costs appear to be an important fac-
tor in land use change decisions. From equations 3‘
and 16, note that the relative costs of adjustment
between land uses can be written as:
(22) -c,t,j(r) = f12r
and cktii(r) = ~1 + (P2 + ~3)r.
The relative returns component of the model can
be written as (the argument of F(.) in equation 16
without the constant term or the adjustment cost
component):
(23)
E[R@(gk) - R~~(q~)]= ~4((1 - @)RS~i
- (1 - +Y?,.,)
+ (35((1 – W)%j,t-1
- (1 - +)K,P,,-l)
+ 86(( 1 – @)~sj,t-:
- (1 - +)%.1-2)
-2
. .
+ @7: 4%p,t + @8(% – 9s).
Consider a farmer with a specific •~,. Land at site
k which is in pasture at time t – 1 will be converted
to cropland when:
(24) ~k,< P()+ ~[~jf(qk) - Rit(9k)] - Ckti(rf).
If land at site k is in crop production at time t– 1,
the land would be converted to pasture when:
(25) PO+ ~Rjt(9k) – ‘it(qk)] + Ckji(rr) < l kt.
Table 2 gives the values of the components of
equations (24) and (25) for average crop yield po-
tential in Iowa (q = 124) and associated conver-
sion probabilities, computed using equations (22)
and (23) and the estimated coefficients from table
1. The parameters in a discrete choice model are
estimated only up to a scale factor, u (see footnote
7), so that the values in columns 3,4, and 5 can be
interpreted only in relation to each other. Conver-
sion probabilities are calculated by assuming that
l kf follows a standard normal distribution, consis-
tent with the assumptions of the estimation. Note
that while average relative returns change signifi-
cantly between 1980 and 1987, they are small rela-
tive to. fti(r) and cji(r). Accordingly, conversion
probablhties are never high, even through they do
change significantly (in percentage terms) between
1980 and 1987. More interestingly, the results in-
dicate that there is a significant asymmetry in ad-
justment costs/rigidities. Landowners appear to ex-
perience higher costs or are simply more reluctant
to convert cropland to pasture than pasture to crop-
land, As a consequence, the probability of convert-
ing land from pasture to cropland is generally
greater than the probability of a cropland to pasture
conversion for non-CRP eligible land.
Figure 1 shows how the probability of land use
conversion changes with land quality for 1987 eco-
nomic conditions in Iowa. The three lines traced
out in figure 1 correspond to the probability of
pasture to cropland conversion, the probability of
converting non-CRP eligible land from crop pro-
duction to pasture, and the probability that CRP-
eligible land is converted from cropland to non-
cropland use (pasture or CRP). The probability of
pasture to cropland conversion increases with land34 April 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
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Figure 1. Probability of land use conversion.
quality while the probability of conversion from
cropland to pasture or CRP decreases. At all but
the very lowest levels of land quality, the probabil-
ity of cropland to pasture conversion is smaller
than the probability of pasture to cropland conver-
sion for non-CRP eligible land. However, the prob-
ability of converting CRP eligible cropland to pas-
ture or CRP exceeds the probability of converting
pasture to crop production for land with a land
quality index of 138 or lower. The results suggest
that CRP significantly increased the retirement of
highly erodible cropland in the Corn Belt, rather
than simply paying producers to retire land that
may have been converted to pasture in any case.
Table 2 shows that the probability of conversion of
cropland to pasture rose slowly during the mid-80s,
but that it was always low relative to the probabil-
ity of pasture to cropland conversion. Unfortu-
nately, it is not possible to know whether points
which were converted to grass cover were actually
converted to grazing land or placed under CRP
contract (the 1987 NRI does not indicate whether
points are, in fact, enrolled in CRP). Moreover,
some land placed under CRP contract may have
been removed from crop production in any case.
However, these scenarios seem unlikely for
land with crop acreage base, given the avail-
ability of substantial deficiency payments in the
late 1980s.
Note that table 2 and figure 1 show only the
predicted probability of conversion. Predicted con-
version also depends critically on the amount of
land available for conversion at each level of qual-
ity. For example, at high levels of land quality,
even a large probability of pasture to crop conver-
sion can result in only a small change in predicted
acreage if very little high quality land is devoted to
pasture and, as such, available for conversion to
cropland. If the distribution of land quality is heav-
ily weighted toward medium quality land, the ma-
jority of land use conversion may take place on
average quality land, even though the probability
of conversion is greatest at very low and/or very
high levels of land quality, depending on economic
conditions.
Conclusions
This study used a discrete choice model and site-
specific data to analyze land conversions between
crop and pasture or CRP in the Corn Belt between
1980 and 1987. As hypothesized, the results indi-
cate that the conversion probabilities depend on the
relative returns from crop production and pasture,
government policy (CRP), and land quality. The
results suggest that adjustment costs/rigidities are
both large (relative to other components of the es-
timated equation) and asymmetric, The results for
Iowa showed that the probability of pasture to
cropland conversion increases with land quality
while conversion from cropland to noncropland
uses decreases with land quality.
Estimates of conversion costs/rigidities suggestClaassen and Tegene
that land can become “fixed” in a particular use.
The asymmetry of conversion costs/rigidities sug-
gests that land is more likely to become fixed in
crop production than in non-cropland uses. While
land is converted to crop production and from crop
production to another use in every year of the time
series, Corn Belt landowners appear to be gener-
ally less inclined to remove land from crop pro-
duction than to convert land to crop production for
land that was not eligible for the CRP. This is true
even for low quality land which was not eligible
for the CRP. The asymmetry found here is consis-
tent with a long term trend toward increasing crop-
land acreage in the Corn Belt. Results could be
quite different for other regions where crop pro-
duction land use has been declining over the long
term.
CRP eligibility significantly increased the prob-
ability of converting land away from crop produc-
tion. While the data do not allow us to distinguish
between CRP and non-CRP conversions, the evi-
dence suggests that less Corn Belt land would have
been retired from crop production without the CRP
program, Figure 1 suggests that, in the absence of
government intervention, net retirement of land
from crop production is unlikely for almost any
quality of Corn Belt land, even during a period of
depressed returns (e.g., 1987). Again, results may
be different for regions where crop production land
use is declining.
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Notes
1. A site is a field or area of uniform quality.
2. See Maddala P.23.
3. Note that the location subscript is suppressed as
a change in land quality is due to a change in
location.
4. This is true of the original CRP as formulated in
1986–87, but CRP rental rates are now limited on
a soil-specific basis.
5. In a model of farmland prices, adaptive expec-
tations performed better than rational expectations
in Tegene and Kuchler (1991), naive expectations36 April 1999 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
gave the best fit in Just and Miranowski (1993)
relative to adaptive and rational expectations. Falk
(1991) also argued that myopic behavior consistent
with naive expectations underlies his land price
results. It should be noted that both naive and adap-
tive expectations express expected value as a func-
tion of past (and current) values, where the coef-
ficients decline geometrically with the lag length in
adaptive expectations. If the information set is lim-
ited to current and past values of the variable in
question, rational expectations also result in a dis-
tributed lag structure.
6. Note that lag length did not affect specification
with respect to land quality variables or vice-versa,
7. Estimated adjustment costs are average because
they will vary from site to site. Site specific varia-
tion in adjustment costs and rigidities become part
of the error term. Estimated adjustments costs are
relative because parameters in the probit model can
be estimated only up to a scale factor, l/u, where
u is the standard deviation of (l/a)(u~if – ~~jr).
Also note that, in this context, adjustment costs
are interpreted as all costs (and other sources of
inertia) not explained by other independent vari-
ables. These may include economic costs which
are not accounting costs, such as the utilization of
management skills. For example, landowners in a
predominantly grain-growing region may choose
crop production, all other things being equal, be-
cause available farm management skills will tend
to be skewed toward crop production.
8. The opportunity cost of all land uses other than
cropland, pasture, or CRP is assumed to be zero.
Although this is a rather restrictive assumption, it
is reasonable for the farm states considered in this
study.
9, The sample period is dictated by the availability
of consistent data. The latest NRI data is 1992.
However, the 1992 NRI does not contain cropping
history except for cropland.
10. The gap in the time series exists because the
NRI contains no data on land use for 1983,
11. Although prices vary significantly both spa-
tially and over time, price ratios are quite constant.
For example, the mean ratio of the season average
soybean price to the season average corn price over
all states and year 1975–92 is 2.55. The standard
deviation of these ratios is 0.39,